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Women’s movements – both domestic and international – have made enormous political gains 
just in the past century.  Gender inequality persists, however, in institutionalized politics around 
the world.  The proportion of women in national legislatures or parliaments serves as a useful 
indicator and basis for cross-national comparison of political, as well as social, (in)equality; 
numerous scholars have offered explanations for the relative lack of women’s political 
representation in parliaments and for the global differences in that representation.  This field, 
however, has not fully analyzed women’s social movements as factor increasing women’s 
legislative presence.  Likewise, social movement theory, although it has often grappled with 
operationalizing movement outcomes, has not fully addressed outcomes that are both political 
and cultural, as is women’s political representation.  Using data from women’s organizations that 
are registered with the United Nations, this paper employs OLS multiple regression to analyze 
the effect of women’s social movement organizing on the percentage of women in parliament, 
using a sample of countries from around the world.  Location in Scandinavia and national quota 
threshold are consistently significant factors, which supports previous research.  Although 
organizations are not initially a strong explanatory factor for the proportion of women in politics, 
interactions between organizations and civil liberties, GDP, and the regions of sub-Saharan 
Africa and Eastern Europe are significant variables.  This study find that the presence of 
women’s organizations lessens and can even reverse the negative relationship between civil 
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liberties and percent female legislators.  GDP and women’s political representation are positively 
related, but the presence of women’s organizations increases the strength of the relationship, 
where even a small increase in GDP leads to substantial gains in women’s political 
representation.  Past research has found that countries in sub-Saharan Africa often have higher 
proportions of female legislators, and that finding is borne out here; women’s organizations, 
however, actually moderate that relationship, such that African women’s organizing is negatively 
associated with political representation.  Finally, this paper finds that, although Eastern Europe is 
negatively associated with women’s political representation, the presence of women’s 
organizations attenuates that relationship. 
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PREFACE 
 
I would like to convey my appreciation to everyone who lent their time, patience, and insight to 
helping me write this thesis.  My committee was indispensible; thank you to Kathy, Melanie, and 
Rachel for your comments, advice, and encouragement.  Thank you also to John Markoff and my 
workshop peers for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper – hopefully it’s come 
a long way since you last saw it!  I am indebted to all of you for making this thesis what it is.
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Women’s movements – both domestic and international – have made enormous political gains 
just in the past century.  Inequality persists, however, in terms of policy, cultural expectations, 
economic standing, and in political representation; indeed, women currently make up only 19% 
of national legislators around the world (IPU 2010).  Explanations for the persistence of this 
political gender gap cover a wide range from the cultural to the structural.  One of the 
understudied topics in this area is the role of social movement activism in increasing women’s 
political presence in national legislatures.  Scholarship analyzing the disparity in political 
representation often fails to address social movement activity, and social movement theory has 
not developed sufficient models for studying movements’ political or cultural successes, 
particularly not for women’s political presence – an outcome that I argue is reflective of both 
political and cultural changes.  Exploring and establishing connections between movement 
organizing and increased political participation will bridge social movement theory and feminist 
political science and political sociology.  In addition, globalized, macrocomparative research is a 
fast-growing subfield within both of these areas in need of continued study. 
To this end I conduct a quantitative analysis of the relationship between domestic 
women’s organizations registered with the United Nations and the proportion of women in 
national legislature in nations around the world.  Using a sample of countries from each region, I 
regress the percent of female legislators on a count of women’s social movement organizations, 
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controlling for other variables found relevant in previous research.  I hypothesize that higher 
levels of women’s movement organizing is associated with higher levels of women in politics. 
Addressing the gaps in the literature outlined below, I argue that the presence of more 
women in national politics is a combination of both political and cultural outcomes for women’s 
movements.  The makeup of the political system changes with the inclusion of more women, but 
this also both indicates and affects cultural change.  Cultural ideals about women must change so 
as to allow for their political involvement, meaning that women’s political presence is a marker 
of change, but the presence of women in these positions of power also serves to further challenge 
traditional cultural ideas about women’s subordinate status.  The proportional presence of 
women in national legislatures, therefore, is both a measure of and a driving force for change in 
cultural ideas about women.  I am more directly analyzing the indicator role, but this thesis is 
also motivated by and advocates a need for continued change. 
I theorize a causal relationship between women’s social movement organizations and 
presence in national politics that is fundamentally one-way.  Certainly, female politicians could 
increase women’s activism by contributing to women’s organizations or supporting policy that 
fosters social movement organizing, for example.  However, the scholarship on women’s 
substantive representation,1 though admittedly underdeveloped, does not address the effect 
female politicians have had on social movement organizing (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 
2007).  Some scholars find that women are more likely to prioritize bills related to children, 
family, women’s issues, and social services (e.g. Thomas 1991, Little, Dunn, and Deen 2001); 
                                                 
1 As opposed to formal (mere presence of women in politics) or descriptive (numeric parity between legislature and 
population in terms of gender) representation, substantive representation is “substantive” in that higher proportions 
of women lead to more woman-friendly and progressive policies.  
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these policies may increase social movement activity indirectly, but existing research has not 
established such linkages.   
On the other hand, social movement activity can directly lead to individuals’ 
politicization as well as the overall cultural and structural prerequisites for more women in the 
legislature.  Social movement activism not only has a biographical impact on activists (Auyero 
2003, Fendrich and Lovoy 1988, McAdam 1999) that may politicize them, but also 
fundamentally alters cultural perceptions and discourses (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006).  In 
addition to dramatic cultural change, women’s organizations also change both the supply of and 
the demand for female candidates.  Movements can increase the pool of female candidates 
through creating networks and public role models, giving civic skills, increasing political 
knowledge, and even by bringing women into the public sphere (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 
2001, Kirkpatrick 1974).  Movements also alter political institutions in ways that may be 
favorable for women, through advocating for gender quotas and supporting sympathetic parties 
and politicians.  These effects on activists, culture, supply, and demand provide the foundation 
for the hypothesized causal effects of women’s organizing on political representation.  This is the 
first global study to test the effects of domestic women’s organizations on women’s 
representation. 
I find that the hypothesized relationship does, in fact, exist.  Although the number of 
women’s organizations is not on its own the strongest predictor of women’s political 
representation, there is a positive relationship between the two.  Moreover, this relationship is 
also influenced and implicated in several others.  The interaction between women’s 
organizations and civil liberties is a significant one, supporting past research that has emphasized 
the importance of the civil society component of democracy in affecting women’s political 
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participation.  I explore regional differences and regional interactions with organizations, as well; 
organizations have significant effects in sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, in particular. 
 
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of women in politics and the study of social movements are both extremely rich fields 
of research, covering a broad spectrum of sub-topics and themes.  This project acts as a bridge 
between these two related, but rarely unified, fields.  Women have been – and largely still are – 
excluded from formal political systems across the globe, as evidenced by the widespread absence 
of women in positions of substantial political power.  Scholars explain this absence in national 
legislatures in terms of “supply” and “demand” factors within political structures as well as the 
overall culture; the emphasis is on the nation-state and national government.   
Much of the empirical research on women in national legislatures, however, does not 
address women’s social movements as an important explanatory factor.  Social movement theory 
also posits the state as a central player, especially in the study of outcomes, but the 
internationalization of economies, political bodies, and movements speaks to the increasing 
importance of international actors and fora.  Women’s movements registered and/or in 
consultative status with the United Nations represent just this intersection of national and global.  
Using a database of these organizations and their effect on the numbers of women in legislatures, 
I also draw on social movement scholarship on outcomes.  Most scholars discuss legal, 
legislative, and political changes as structural, as opposed to cultural, outcomes.  Increased 
numbers of women in positions of power, as a component of state-based change, is structural, but 
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it also marks a cultural change.  I argue that women’s presence in the legislature represents a 
different kind of success – in that it is both cultural and structural – for social movement 
organizing than has previously been theorized. 
1.1.1 Women in Politics 
Although some current women’s movements, particularly in Western nations, have in many 
ways moved away from state-centered organizing and toward cultural politics, the battle for 
national political representation, much less national advocacy for women’s issues, is far from 
won.  Feminist theory and feminist organizing have since their very beginnings analyzed and 
mobilized around the role of the state in legislating change and women’s role within the state and 
polity.  The state is fundamentally male not only in a theoretical sense (e.g. Brush 2003, 
MacKinnon 1989, Pateman 1988, Phillips 1991, Young 1990), but in specific terms of 
representation and policy.  The modern state is founded on and its power legitimated by claims 
of objectivity and impartiality, which feminist scholars regard as not only false (that the state is 
subjectively male), but as erasing difference and delegitimating dissent.  The classical liberal 
subject is an abstracted ideal, treated as if sovereign and isolated, “decontextualized from the 
unequal conditions of our lives” (Brown 1995: 110).  This abstraction leaves little room for other 
types of citizens. 
In more concrete terms, gender differences are still prevalent, and very pronounced, in 
terms of heads of state, cabinets, national legislatures, and local politics around the world, not to 
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mention in policy.2  Chowdhury and Nelson et al (1994) place this political disparity at the 
forefront, referring to the “ubiquity of women’s secondary political status” (3).  Theory on 
women in politics is greatly concerned with explaining the roots of these disparities, their 
exceptions, and their implications (e.g. Hughes 2009, Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Kirkpatrick 
1974, Matland 1998, Matland 2010, Oakes and Almquist 1993, Paxton 1997, Paxton, Hughes, 
and Green 2006, Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010, Rule 1987, Yoon 2001).  This project, too, 
uses as a starting point and theoretical motivation the conception of the state as exclusionary to 
women, but also an integral site of contestation and opportunity. 
 Much of the research mentioned above puts a particular emphasis on explaining the lack 
of women in positions of power, particularly legislatures.  The explanations for the relative 
absence of women are wide ranging.  They are usually delineated as supply-side or demand-side 
(Paxton 1997, Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007, Randall 1987).  Supply-side includes factors 
that “supply” viable female candidates, such as political knowledge, political ambition, 
education, financial resources, and female role models (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2006).  Gender 
imbalances in each of these areas lead to a smaller supply of female than male candidates.  For 
example, professional occupations – as a marker of financial resources and power – are often 
predominantly held by men.  Also, the low number of women in positions of power perpetuates 
itself because there are fewer role models for young women interested in politics than for young 
men.  These factors help shape the “pool” of women who are qualified and motivated to run for 
office, as well as their chances of winning elections. 
                                                 
2 Assessing the presence, implementation, and success of woman-friendly policies, ranging from sexual assault and 
domestic violence laws to maternity leave provisions, is another, extremely rich area of research that overlaps with 
the women in politics field.  Unfortunately, this project does not have the space to address this other component of 
gender imbalances in politics. 
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Demand-side focuses more on political institutions and structures.   Scholars in this area 
study the governmental system itself or the role of party dynamics.  Many focus on the role of 
democracy, usually finding it to be relatively insignificant in accounting for proportions of 
female legislators (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Paxton 1997), 
although Paxton, Hughes, and Painter (2010) find that democracy as a processual, rather than 
static variable, does indeed positively influence women’s political representation; they also find 
that the civil liberties component of democracy is much more important indicator.  Viterna and 
Fallon (2008), among others, also examine the role of democratization in increasing women’s 
political participation, and find that its importance varies by different components of the 
democratization process and women’s movements.   
The type of electoral system has been found to be another important explanatory variable.   
Multiple studies have highlighted the importance of proportional representation systems in 
increasing the proportion of women in legislatures (e.g. Norris 1997, Paxton 1997, Paxton, 
Hughes, and Painter 2010, Rule 1987).  This type of electoral system matches the proportion of 
seats for a party to the proportion of votes the party won; voters cast ballots for parties, rather 
than candidates, so minority candidates do not stand alone.  More recent work has questioned the 
effect of proportional representation system in new democracies (Viterna and Fallon 2008) but it 
remains an important variable.   
Finally, the gender quota, which mandates a certain proportion of female candidates or 
legislators, is a significant factor in determining women’s level of political representation (e.g. 
Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Paxton and Hughes 2007).  This may seem to be self-evident, 
but there is notable variation in the proportion of women mandated, enforcement, and whether 
quotas are by party or by political body (Krook 2010; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010).  The 
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context of the adoption of quotas is another separate subfield, and it is important to note that 
Beckwith (2003) and Matland (2010) do acknowledge the role of women’s social movement 
organizing in advocating and establishing a quota system, and Krook (2006) addresses the 
transnational role of movements in diffusing strategies and information about quotas.  None, 
however, measure women’s movements cross-nationally as an explanatory factor for women’s 
political representation.  In general, the systematic study of the role of social movements is left 
out of these political explanations of women’s political representation. 
Culture, a concept somewhat harder to define, also plays a major role in determining the 
number of both potential and elected female legislators.  Measured with variables such as region 
or religion, culture is usually conceived as operating outside of or indirectly through more 
structural supply and demand factors (Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007).  I agree with Paxton 
and Kunovich (2003) that culture influences both supply and demand, and also operates 
independently.  For instance, cultural ideals affect the perception of women as legitimate and 
capable political actors, and concretely affect whether women have the resources to run for 
office.  The dichotomization of culture and structure is a shortcoming in the literature, with few 
works attempting to address both components simultaneously.  Norris and Inglehart (2001) are a 
notable exception, maintaining that “structural and institutional explanations need to be 
supplemented by accounts emphasizing the importance of political culture” (2001: 131).  I will 
discuss what I see as the mutually influential spiral of culture and politics in greater detail below.   
 I draw on these theories of women’s presence in politics, using many of the above factors 
as control variables in my analysis.  I depart from them, however, in that I posit the level of 
domestic social movement organizing as a significant factor explaining proportions of women in 
parliaments, which has been understudied in the field of women and politics.  A corollary to 
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explanations of barriers to women’s political representation are the explanations of the means 
used to overcome these barriers.  Social movement organizing provides a particularly effective 
means to effect change both in political structures and in the larger society. 3 
1.1.2 The State, Globalization, and Women’s Social Movements 
The women in politics literature outlined above addresses representation inequalities specifically 
within the state and is, in general, expressly concerned with state-level problems and 
explanations.  The state has long been a primary location of interest for feminist (and social 
movement) scholars.  If gender inequality is so pervasive (Burn 2000), why privilege the study 
of the state as a site of inequality? 4  First, on the most basic level, both gender inequality and the 
state are fundamentally rooted in questions of power.  Brush (2003) draws a useful analogy with 
banks: people use money all the time, but banks are consolidated centers of money that are 
therefore often the target of those seeking to take money.  Likewise, people are constantly 
engaging in microsocial acts structured by power, but power is more concretely consolidated in 
the state apparatus; it is therefore often the target of those wishing to take or redistribute power.   
The state is a theoretically useful concept for what it represents, but also because that 
representation also makes it a concrete target and site of opposition.  Social movements use that 
same perception of the state to make it a primary target.  Similarly, inequality within national 
                                                 
3 Many women are in places where “social movements” as defined in the West (i.e. public, organized contentious 
politics) are not really possible, and they often participate in more everyday methods of attempting to change 
society, sometimes called non-movements (Bayat 2007).  These are fascinating cases of resistance and in need of 
much more study, but since my sample includes only democratic or semidemocratic nations, these places are 
excluded. 
 
4 Like much of the women in politics literature, I am studying national legislatures – both upper and lower houses – 
as a proxy for “the state” writ large.  The state operates in multiple other venues and its power is manifested in many 
ways, but the legislature is (theoretically) the most accessible to its citizens. 
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legislatures is often the most visible manifestation of gender inequality, in that the state is 
explicitly public and made up of public figures.  This readily apparent difference becomes useful 
as a mobilization tool – which I address below – and as a measure of gender parity in a larger 
sense – which helps form the foundation of this study.  The state understood as a center of power 
and gender understood as a differential of power in many ways flattens out the nuances of both, 
but is representative of people’s lived experiences, understandings, and of concrete mobilizations 
in much of the world. 
 Those concrete mobilizations by social movements also speak to the significance of the 
state.  Many social movements explicitly engage the state, targeting political systems with tactics 
such as petitions, electoral campaigns, and marches on national capitols.  Even if a movement is 
not explicitly state-oriented, it must interact with the state; it is a component of society and of the 
political system itself.  More important for this study, movements often have state-centered goals 
or outcomes, such as the passage of legislation, the creation of commissions or committees 
regarding an issue, or ending involvement in an international conflict, to name only a small few.  
Even definitions of social movements are often premised on the presence of a state target (e.g. 
Tarrow 1995, Tilly 1990).  More specifically, in judging the “success” of a movement, change in 
legislation is often the first place theorists look (Amenta et al 2010, Guigni 1998).  Although I do 
not study these outcomes specifically, I do address the importance of change within the state via 
change in the number of female representatives.   
The placement of movements within the political structure is also conceptualized in a 
wide variety of ways.  Social movements are traditionally seen as operating outside the state, as 
external factors attempting to act on and influence the state, which is seen as an independent, 
separate body.  Other theorists question this separation and dichotomization of social movement 
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and state.  The relationship may actually be more synergistic and interactional.  For example, 
some scholars argue that the way the legislative system itself works affects how social 
movements work; state-level suffrage movements in the U.S. varied in their effectiveness 
because of how state governments operated (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005).  In a different 
vein, Markoff (forthcoming) advocates for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between movements and states, maintaining that social movements are an integral part of the 
way democratic political systems work, rather than operating externally from that political 
system.  Similarly, Paxton (2002) sees social movements as a component of social capital, which 
she argues is interdependent with democracy. 
1.1.2.1 Globalization and Transnational Activism 
In addition to this state focus, social movements are increasingly concerned with and 
engaging with international and transnational issues and actors, and women’s movements have 
been at the forefront of this internationalization.  States remain significant actors in an 
increasingly globalized and interconnected world,5 and movements often straddle or hybridize 
these two scales.  Social movements operate at the crux of local and global in many ways, from 
relating local issues to struggles occurring in other countries, to cooperations between groups or 
individuals across boundaries, to diffusion of specific tactics to other groups.  Della Porta and 
Tarrow (2005) group transnational activism processes into: internalization, or the making local 
                                                 
5 “Globalization” in itself is a contested term, used variously to reference increasing economic, social, and political 
interactions across state boundaries, and the continued salience of the nation-state (as a primary economic, social, or 
political unit) is the subject of much debate in a variety of disciplines.  Frameworks such as world-system theory 
(Wallerstein 2004), concepts like “global cities” (Sassen 1999) or the “transnational capitalist class” (Sklair 2001) 
emphasize global interconnectedness, particularly in terms of economics and economies, at different scales than the 
nation-state –  implicitly or explicitly arguing for the waning importance of the national scale.  I advocate a middle 
ground that recognizes the resilience and significance of the nation-state while still addressing international 
phenomena, much like Keck and Sikkink (1998) or Boli and Thomas (1999).   
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of some international problem; diffusion, or the sharing of tactics, issues, targets, and ideas; 
externalization, or the action of a domestic group on an international level; and the newer field of 
transnational collective action, or coordinated international campaigns against non-domestic 
targets.  Or as Tarrow (2005) more efficiently describes, we see the local in the global and the 
global in the local.  The field of social movement studies analyzing transnational activism has 
rapidly expanded in recent years, but, based on my primary data source, this study is limited to 
engaging those aspects that address the role of and interactions with the United Nations. 
The United Nations is a dynamic and unique force in globalization.  It represents and 
facilitates international connectedness and the exchange or diffusion of international norms 
between states, and is also an important forum for non-state actors – NGOs in particular, and 
increasingly more so.  Since its creation, the United Nations has been an extremely important 
advocate for women and women’s rights (Pietila and Vickers 1994), contributing in particular to 
the spread of norms about (women’s) human rights, which have been powerful forces of change 
(e.g. Htun and Weldon 2010).  Ratification of international treaties and regulatory documents, 
such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), help 
hold governments accountable for implementing women’s rights policies, leading to better 
conditions for women (Pietila and Vickers 1994, Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006).  
International conferences organized or hosted by the UN, such as Beijing 1995, have directly 
helped improve conditions for women around the world (Smith, Mueller, and Kutz-Flamenbaum 
forthcoming).  In both of these arenas, non-governmental organizations have played an integral 
role, and have in turn themselves been affected by the UN and its actions. 6 
                                                 
6 I am using NGO interchangeably here with social movement organization, or SMO.  As non-state, nonprofit, 
public, voluntary associations that advocate for specific groups or issues to state and international actors, NGOs are 
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The UN has been actively increasing its engagement with NGOs, especially as per the 
recommendations of the 2004 Cardoso Report.  This panel called for a deepening of relations 
with civil society organizations, leading to what Weiss, Carayannis, and Jolly (2009) call the 
growth of the “Third UN.”  This third component of the UN system, made up of NGOs and 
outside consultants, exists in a “symbiotic relationship” (Coates 2009: 154) with the first and 
second – intergovernmental bodies made up of member states and the secretariats made up of 
civil servants, respectively.  Although Willetts (2006), among others, has called for a reform of 
this civil society system and how organizations are accredited, the relationship between the UN 
and NGOs in states across the globe remains extremely strong and vibrant.  NGOs have largely 
been responsible for the success of conferences such as Beijing, and these conferences create and 
reinforce ties between different groups and activists, as well as use those organizations to aid the 
diffusion of international norms. 
The organizations that are affiliated with the UN exist squarely in that intersection 
between the state-based and international realms discussed above.  They are the product of local 
organizing and represent the interests of people within a country or region, but are connected to 
and international network and forum.  The organizations registered with the UN, specifically 
those addressing the issue of the advancement of women, form my independent variable of 
interest, with the number of women’s organizations serving as a proxy for movement strength in 
each country.  These data directly link local and international, which speaks to the current state 
of social movement organizing across the globe. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
defined very similarly to SMOs.  They are seen as more hierarchical than grassroots SMOs, but this categorization is 
oversimplified (see Smith 2008, esp. 247n2). 
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1.1.3 Social Movement Outcomes and Success 
Regardless of scale, one of the primary questions facing investigations of social movements is 
that of outcomes or success.  Measuring or even conceptualizing success for movements has 
been notoriously difficult.  Tarrow succinctly addresses the heart of the issue: “everyone who has 
worked on social movements knows how important it is to try to understand their outcomes.  
Almost everyone admits the extreme difficult of doing so” (1999: vii).   Reviews of social 
movements literature regarding outcomes and success too acknowledge that rigorous study of 
outcomes has been limited, and advocate for continued work in this area (Amenta et al 2010, 
Earl 2000, Guigni 1998).  Felix Kolb calls the scholarly work in this area “a literature that grows 
but does not accumulate” (2007:6).  These scholars have created numerous typologies and 
taxonomies for outcomes, but two differentiations are key for this project – internal/external and 
political/cultural.   
Internal, inter-movement, and biographical consequences are somewhat easier to trace 
than external, but extra-movement outcomes remain both widely sought and difficult to 
operationalize.  Social movement theorists often study specific outcomes or “successes” of social 
movements in terms of policy change, though they are increasingly emphasizing cultural 
outcomes as well (Earl 2000, Gamson 1998).  Outcomes are framed, however, as one or the 
other, which is a conceptual shortcoming.  As mentioned above, increasing numbers of women 
in political positions represents an inseparable mix of both cultural and political change. 
A further difficulty in measuring success is that the political presence of women does not 
necessarily, immediately translate into concrete social transformation for women.  Higher 
numbers of female representatives may aid in agenda-setting, but as Lovenduski and Norris 
(1993) remind us, it is often the case that institutions change women before women change 
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institutions.  One outcome that movements may specifically seek or seek to avoid is state 
feminism, variously defined as feminists in government (Sawer 1990), feminism in public 
agencies (Eisenstein 1990), the ability of the state to follow a feminist agenda (Stetson 1987), 
and the advocacy of movement demands from within the state (Lovenduski et al 2005).  State 
feminism is a contested terrain, with some feminists equating it with co-optation and weakening 
of the women’s movement by the state, and others lauding its ability to get woman-friendly 
legislation discussed and passed.   
Sometimes tied in with state feminism, the presence of woman-friendly policy is an 
external, additional and complementary measure of movement success.  Again, policy change is 
often an important component of social movement outcomes, the more so for women’s 
movements that must work to even get women’s issues on the table.  This influence on agenda-
setting may occur in a variety of ways.  For example, Lycklama à Nijeholt, Vargas, and Wieringa 
(1998) theorize the “the triangle of empowerment” made up of the women’s movement, feminist 
politicians, and feminist civil servants.  The policy effects of women holding positions in 
national legislatures, albeit fascinating and in need of more study, is unfortunately outside of the 
scope of this paper.  I study the percentage of women in legislatures as the outcome of interest of 
women’s social movement organizing. 
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2.0  METHODS 
 
2.1.1 Research Design 
My primary research question is: does women’s organizing result in concrete gains for 
women in terms of political representation?  My unit of analysis is the country.  Using OLS 
multiple regression, I examine the relationship between the number of women’s organizations 
and the percentage of women in the lower or only house of the legislature, controlling for other 
variables found relevant in past research on women in politics.  These include level of 
development, presence of national quotas, percentage of women in the labor force, Human 
Development Index score, type of electoral system, and region.  All analyses are performed 
using SAS 9.2. 
The models below are based on a process of stepping other variables in and out of the 
regression, while avoiding using collinear variables, monitoring the overall strength of the model 
and standard errors of the variables, and employing variables with small amounts of missing data 
whenever possible.   
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2.1.2 Sampling 
As discussed above, social movement organizing is intimately tied up with democracy.  I 
therefore limit my sample to democratic and semidemocratic nations – those with the laws, civil 
society, and civic space to allow for social movement activity.  This classification is based on 
Freedom House’s freedom scores for 2010.  This NGO assigns to each country a score between 1 
and 7, where scores between 1 and 2.5 are designated “free,” 3 to 5 as “partly free,” and 5.5 to 7 
as “not free.”  These values are based on a series of questions about the electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation, government functioning, freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.  
The overall score is based on the average of the categories “political rights” and “civil liberties.”   
 Since the countries denoted as not free – those scoring higher than a 5 – lack the 
protected civic space needed for organized social movement activity, they were excluded from 
the sample.   My analyses here use the sample based on the full Freedom House score; civil 
liberties are more important for social movement organizing, but political rights are also an 
important factor in determining women’s access to political office.  Although the tables below 
reference the total Freedom House score, I also gathered data and ran regressions on a sample 
based on only the civil liberties score, again limited to those countries that are free or partly 
free.7  To facilitate analysis, however, these were then reverse coded, so that a higher civil 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A for a list of countries in each sample. 
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liberties score means a higher level of civic freedom.8  Where there are notable differences 
between the two samples, those are described below. 
Freedom House lists and gives scores for 195 countries, with 148 of these scoring in the 
free or partly free ranges.  The total population here is in dispute, as some nations are recognized 
by some bodies while others are not.  Taiwan, for example, is a territory in dispute, rated by 
Freedom House but not included in the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s listing of parliaments.  The 
Holy See is included in the UN database as an independent nation, but is not rated by Freedom 
House.  Although slight variations such as these exist, they are not a significant problem or 
indicative of sampling error. 
My sample of only free and partly free states is based on an admittedly simplified notion 
of civil society and democracy; like other democracy indicators, Freedom House does face 
criticism about its indices.  First, measuring levels of democracy is fraught with methodological 
difficulties; the primary issues are conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation (Munck 
and Verkuilen 2002).  Defining a concept like democracy, particularly in light of the extremely 
varied historical and cultural contexts in the world, is a complex undertaking, compounded by 
the difficulty of assigning numerical values and weights to the various components of that 
definition.  In addition, in a different vein of critique, Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (2005) 
point to data-induced measurement error, in which index data are based on inaccurate or 
incomplete information.  Data, particularly about unstable or inaccessible states, are often 
difficult to come by, and the sources of that data may not actually be case experts.  Specifically 
regarding Freedom House, Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñan (2001) examine its 
                                                 
8 Within my main sample, overall Freedom House rating had a mean of 2.43, meaning there were approximately 
equal numbers of free and partly free countries.  In the reverse-coded civil liberties sample, civil liberties scores had 
a mean of 3.39. 
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shortcomings in comparison to their own classification index.  They maintain that Freedom 
House lacks explicit coding rules, and that the organization has a bias against leftist governments 
that has skewed some of its categorization.  They are, though, drawing from measurements from 
1945 to 1999, so these criticisms may be outdated.   
Despite all of these critiques, the Freedom House index remains a useful indicator of 
democracy and civil society.  Any measure will necessarily be somewhat limited, as it pulls 
together different indicators, but its utility remains.  Researchers continue to use Freedom House 
as a means for a variety of projects.  Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel (2002), for example, use the 
Freedom House democracy ratings specifically as a factor in examining women’s political 
participation.  For the purposes of this project, using the Freedom House ratings simply for 
sample boundaries bypasses the criticisms of the index.  Most sources would agree on what 
general categories states would fall into, while they might differ on exact scores or rankings.  In 
addition, I included democracy scores from The Economist as a mechanism for checking the 
sample.  Only full and flawed democracies, or scores of 6 and above, were included in the 
sample.  
In addition, countries with populations of less than one million are excluded.  The 
legislatures of these countries are extremely small, in which the addition of one female legislator 
would increase the percentage by large amounts.  For example, in St. Kitts and Nevis or Tuvalu, 
both with legislatures of only 15 people, an increase of one woman results in an increase of 
almost 7%.   Therefore these countries were excluded from the final model. 
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2.1.3 Measurement 
2.1.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, percentage of female legislators, is taken from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union.  This international organization of parliaments publishes an array of statistics on national 
legislatures in its database.  The Women in National Parliaments section includes a listing of 
each country, date of last election, and the number and percentage of women in the lower or 
single house, as well as the upper house or senate, if applicable.  I gathered both sets of data, and 
created an average of the two for each country (which is simply the lower house if that is the 
only house).  I use both in separate analyses, reporting results for the lower house to stay 
consistent with prior women in politics research, but with the differences noted below.  These 
proportions are current as of January 2011.  Data are missing for the Central African Republic, 
which held its most recent election in January, and for Guinea, as the parliament was dissolved in 
2008 following a coup.  Brunei does not have an elected parliament; its 29 members are 
appointed by the Sultan.  These countries, however, are not included in my primary sample.  
Niger is also not listed in the IPU table, but had a percentage of 9.7 as of January 2010. 
2.1.3.2 Independent Variable 
As stated above, my main independent variable of interest is the number of women’s 
organizations in each country.  The counts of domestic women’s organizations come from the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.  The UN offers free access to its 
Civil Society Database, a listing of non-governmental organizations that are registered with the 
UN.  This registration can aid organizations in a number of ways; perhaps most importantly, it 
“facilitates the application procedure for consultative status with the Economic and Social 
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Council (ECOSOC), and assists accredited NGOs in submitting quadrennial reports and in 
designating representatives to the United Nations” (UN 2010). 
A subset of these organizations fall under the purview of the Commission on the Status of 
Women, and are classified as for the “advancement of women,” which is the database that I 
employ.  The database includes the name, year of registration, organization type, and address, as 
well as any past meeting participation. The database is readily accessible, and all of the 
organization information must be submitted in English or French, which I speak and read. 
Because organizations self-select into the database, using this source helps to avoid many of the   
conceptual or terminological difficulties associated with identifying women’s social movement 
organizations globally.  For example, the term “feminist” is often derided in the developing 
world as a Western invention (Mohanty 1988), but the organizations included in this subset of 
the database are explicitly advocating “the improvement of the status of women in the world, and 
the achievement of their equality with men” (UN 2010).  This designation effectively bypasses 
getting mired in a debate on terms that might exclude relevant organizations.    
This database is useful for a number of other reasons, as well.  Not only does the database 
lend access to countries that might otherwise be hard to include in the sample because of lack of 
access to information, but also the organizations included are those that are established and 
formalized.  The accreditation process is straightforward and routine,9 meaning that 
organizations are not precluded from registering based on access or resources, but their 
accreditation also means that these are the most likely to produce female legislators since they 
are more likely to be closely tied to the political process.  In addition, these organizations have 
                                                 
9 See Bob (forthcoming) for a discussion of some very interesting conflicts and contentions around the symbolic 
significance of UN consultative status. 
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made a concerted effort to establish some international ties and a voice in an international forum.  
By emphasizing organizations with linkages to the international women’s movement, I build on 
research in this field and also draw from an arena that is more established, and again, more likely 
to effect political change.  Yet this approach is distinct from previous research since I analyze 
domestic organizations tied to an international actor, rather than transnational organizations; this 
is the first global study to test the effects of domestic women’s organizations on women’s 
representation.  These groups have the level of formalization, organization, and prestige of being 
connected to greater transnational organizing, but operate within countries, in a space much more 
closely connected with the national political scene and therefore more likely to affect the 
proportion of women in the legislature.  
Some organizations listed in the database that did not appear to be legitimate are 
excluded from the sample.  For example, a few organizations had fake websites and 
unintelligible addresses listed, such as “asdfghkj.”  Organizations were included only if they had 
an intelligible name, description, address, and did not simply select every language and every 
option for “Areas of Expertise and Fields of Activity.”  Finally, only groups that were registered 
prior to 2005 were included, in an attempt to account for the time delay before the political 
effects of increased movement organizing are felt.  In addition, to account for population 
variation I created an organizations per capita variable, which I then logged to reduce skew. 
2.1.3.3 Control Variables 
The model also includes a number of control variables, chosen based on existing scholarship on 
women in politics.  Population, as of July 2010 and taken from the CIA World Factbook, is 
included to calculate per capita proportions for different variables, to control for differences 
based on country size.  GDP per capita, also taken from the CIA World Factbook, is included as 
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a simple measure of development, and is logged to reduce skewness.  Region classification is 
based on the United Nations geographical region groupings, which I then organized into larger 
regions – Latin America (South and Central America) and the Caribbean, Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the US and 
Canada, and Scandinavia.  These regional groupings are used in most women in politics research 
to account for cultural and political similarities within regions, as well as variance between 
regions.  Scandinavia, for instance, is a separate region because of its distinct culture that 
emphasizes gender parity.  The countries of the Middle East and North Africa share many 
cultural and religious characteristics that influence the perception and position of women within 
those countries.  I also created a variable comparing the “developing world” to the industrialized 
West, based on which countries are high-income members of the OECD. 
Countries were also coded for the presence of a proportional representation system, 
according to IDEA International, and for the presence of national quotas (along with thresholds 
for quotas), taken from the database created by Mona Lena Krook (Krook 2009, quotaproject 
2010).  There were not substantial differences between using the quota dummy versus the 
threshold measure, but I used the threshold to capture more of the variation between different 
levels of quotas.  The UN’s Human Development Index was included as another measure of 
development to check for robustness; there were no substantial differences between models using 
GDP and those with HDI.  Since some developing countries receive more funding in general, 
which might lead to increased funding and therefore proliferation of NGOs, I also collected 
recent official development assistance totals for each country, which I then standardized per 
capita and logged to reduce skew.  Countries giving rather than receiving aid were given values 
of 0. 
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In addition to these structural variables, I included the percentage of women in the labor 
force, according to the World Bank as of 2008, as somewhat structural and cultural.  
Participation in the labor force means greater access to resources and wealth and independence 
from family or spouse, but also indicates cultural ideals of women as able to participate in the 
working world outside the home.  In auxiliary analysis, I also included maternal mortality rates 
to signify overall level of women’s health, fertility rates to act as a proxy for both attitudes about 
women’s role as mothers and time and resources for political participation, and the prevalence of 
contraceptive use to employ in much the same way.  Finally, percent of the population who 
identifies as Muslim (as found in the Pew survey from 2009 and augmented with data from the 
U.S. State Department) and Roman Catholic (according to the same sources) served as general 
cultural indicators.  Appendix A includes my correlation matrix and univariate statistics for all 
variables included in the regression models. 
2.1.4 Missing Data, Multicollinearity, Heteroskedasticity, and Outliers 
One problem I initially faced was missing data; information for some countries is simply much 
harder to access.  My sampling method, however, removed many of the cases that would have 
proved problematic, leaving only quota threshold with a missing data point.  My sample size 
then decreased from 108 to 107 cases for my full score sample, and from 129 to 127 for the civil 
liberties auxiliary sample.   
   I ran mulicollinearity diagnostics, and found strong multicollinearity between Africa 
and GDP in particular.  Aid and GDP also had a high bivariate correlation, but are too 
conceptually different to act as proxies for one another.  I therefore ran auxiliary models 
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excluding GDP, to monitor changes in the Africa variable, and excluding aid.  Where this made a 
difference in the results, those differences are discussed or included in footnotes below. 
Heteroskedasticity diagnostics did not return significant results, and using White’s 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors did not substantively alter my findings.  In fact, the 
organizations variable only became more significant, supporting the robustness of my model.  
Similarly, although three potential influential outliers were identified, the removal of those 
outliers did not alter my results.   
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3.0  RESULTS 
3.1.1 Women’s Organizations 
My independent variable of interest, women’s organizations, shows considerable variation across 
the world; it has a mean of about 95 organizations, but a standard deviation of 228.  The median, 
a more representative measure of central tendency in this case, is 33.  Some countries, such as 
East Timor, had no women’s organizations registered with the UN.  India had over 800, the 
second highest overall – although when standardized for population, this was not particularly 
high.  With 2,104 organizations, the U.S. had the maximum number, although adjusting for 
population somewhat changes the picture.  A few countries were outliers, even after controlling 
for population differences.  Switzerland, the US, and the UK, for example, were high outliers; 
the greater number of registered organizations per capita in these countries may be in large part 
due to their housing the physical headquarters of so many international organizations, rather 
than, necessarily, an extraordinarily strong women’s movement.  It is a shortcoming of my data 
and analysis that I cannot directly control for such factors.   
 As mentioned above, women’s organizations per capita was considerably skewed and 
was logged to standardize.  I use this transformed variable in my regression models.  Logged 
women’s organizations per capita ranges from 0 to 0.74, and has a mean of 0.14 and standard 
deviation of 0.11.  Skewness was greatly reduced, but the transformed variable is still slightly 
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skewed; the median is 0.11.  As shown in the table in Appendix B, the log of women’s 
organizations per capita is correlated with other variables in the bivariate.  With the dependent 
variable of percent female legislators in the lower house, organizations has a positive correlation 
coefficient of 0.257.  This relationship is not the highest of the correlation coefficients for the 
women’s organizations variable, but does show that there is some positive relationship between 
the two.  It is slightly weaker than the correlations between organizations and GDP, HDI and 
civil liberties score, which show that development, democracy, and women’s organizing are 
positively related.  I had expected a higher correlation between aid and organizations, but it is 
only -0.178. 
3.1.2 Baseline Regression Model 
My baseline, Model 1, includes the effects of women’s organizations, women’s labor force 
participation, GDP, foreign aid, religion, region, electoral system, and quota threshold on the 
proportion of women in the lower house of parliament.10  Only Scandinavia and quota threshold 
are positively significant.  With a standardized coefficient of 0.31, Scandinavia has the strongest 
effect on women’s political representation.  Scandinavia has been found to be a significant factor 
influencing women’s political representation in past scholarship, and that influence is clearly 
evidenced here as well.  Quotas and quota thresholds are specifically created and instituted in 
order to increase the proportion of women in politics, so the positive effect is to be expected 
here; although, it is important to acknowledge that past research has qualified the importance of 
                                                 
10 Auxiliary analyses were run with the average of the lower and upper houses.  Few substantial differences were 
found, although organizations were more significant, especially in the overall Freedom House score sample, as 
opposed to the civil liberties sample.  Since countries with lower overall scores have more political openness and 
freedom, perhaps their upper house legislators are more likely to also be elected, rather than appointed. 
 
  28 
quotas, based on implementation and type.  The variable used here is a simplified understanding 
of quotas.  Women’s labor force participation is only marginally significant (p=0.11); I had 
expected this relationship to be stronger.11  Also, proportional representation system, a factor that 
past studies have been found to be important, is not significant here.12  The organizations 
variable is not significant in this initial model, though its importance may just be mediated by 
other factors, as will be discussed below in subsequent models.13  Overall, the model has an 
adjusted R2 of 0.30, suggesting that the baseline model accounts for 30 percent of the variance in 
women’s legislative representation; this is not strikingly high, considering these are mostly 
structural variables.  With such a limited number of cases, however, I cannot add more 
explanatory variables. 
 Table 1 below shows the coefficients, standard errors, and standardized estimates for this 
baseline model as well as the interaction models.  These interactions between logged women’s 
organizations per capita and civil liberties, percent Muslim, aid, and GDP are also discussed in 




                                                 
11 In the auxiliary civil liberties sample, labor force participation is a much stronger predictor of women’s political 
representation.  It is significant at the 0.01 level and has a standardized coefficient of 0.30.  Since the civil liberties 
sample includes more developing countries, perhaps this difference shows that labor force participation is a more 
important factor in women’s advancement in developing countries than in the more politically stable countries. 
 
12 In the auxiliary civil liberties sample, PR system is in fact significant and has a standardized coefficient of 0.15.  
Again, the additional countries included in this sample are developing nations, with less political rights.  With lower 
levels of institutional democracy, the presence of a PR system may play a greater role in increasing women’s access 
to positions of political power.   
 
13 It is also important to note that I ran auxiliary models without aid and without GDP, due to concerns about 
multicollinearity.  In the model with only GDP, that variable is significant at 0.1.  If only aid is included, the 
organizations variable becomes marginally significant, with a p-value of 0.11.  The coefficients and standardized 
estimates are slightly different, but directionality does not change. 
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Table 1. Baseline and Interaction Models Regressed on Percent Female Legislators in Lower House 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  




 b                 
(S.E.) β 
 b                 
(S.E.) β 
 b                 
(S.E.) Β 








17.4t   
(9.89) 0.19 
19.80t   
(11.62) 0.21 
2.81   
(9.91) 0.03 
Percent Women 
in Labor Force 
0.15   
(0.09) 0.19 
0.13   
(0.10) 0.16 
0.15   
(0.09) 0.19 




(Log) GDP 4.19   (3.33) 0.23 
4.61   
(3.75) 0.26 
4.79   
(3.33) 0.27 






-0.09   
(0.73) -0.02 
-0.05   
(0.74) -0.01 
0.03   
(0.73) 0.01 
0.57   
(0.91) 0.11 
-0.02   
(0.72) -0.004 
Percent Muslim -0.02   (0.04) -0.05 
-0.02  
(0.04) -0.07 
0.05   
(0.07) 0.16 
-0.03   
(0.04) -0.07 
-0.03   
(0.04) -0.08 
Percent Catholic 0.04   (0.04) 0.13 
0.03   
(0.04) 0.10 
0.05   
(0.04) 0.15 
0.03   
(0.04) 0.11 
0.03   
(0.04) 0.09 
Latin America -2.41   (3.13) -0.09 




-1.82   
(3.16) -0.07 
-1.51   
(3.14) -0.06 
Asia 0.66   (3.83) 0.02 
0.33   
(3.87) 0.01 
0.15   
(3.82) 0.004 
0.76   
(3.82) 0.02 
0.60   
(3.78) 0.02 
Africa 1.88   (3.89) 0.08 
2.95   
(3.94) 0.12 
2.84   
(3.92) 0.12 
2.70   
(3.94) 0.11 
3.05   
(3.91) 0.13 
Eastern Europe -2.05   (3.38) -0.07 
-1.15   
(3.41) -0.04 




-1.42   
(3.36) -0.05 
Scandinavia 16.78**   (5.19) 0.31 
16.35**   
(5.19) 0.30 
16.70**   
(5.16) 0.31 
16.52**   
(5.19) 0.30 
16.40**   
(5.14) 0.30 
Middle East -5.12   (5.01) -0.10 
-4.19   
(5.18) 0.00 
-3.79   
(5.06) -0.08 
-4.94   
(5.00) -0.10 
-4.98   
(4.96) -0.10 
PR System 2.95   (1.95) 0.14 
2.62   
(2.05) 0.13 
2.27   
(1.99) 0.11 




Quota Threshold 0.17*     (0.07) 0.23 
0.18**   
(0.07) 0.25 






Civil Liberties     
-1.56  
(1.41) -0.19           
Civil Liberties 
Interaction    
12.10t   
(7.74) 0.64           
Muslim 
Interaction       
-0.66   
(0.44) -0.26        
Aid Interaction          
-5.03   
(4.18) -0.19     
GDP Interaction                 26.79
t  
(15.14) 0.18 
Intercept -10.45 -5.14 -13.87 -9.17 9.06 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.32 
N 107 107 107 107 107 
 
*p < 0.05    **p < 0.01   ***p < 0.001   tp < 0.1 (two-tailed tests) 
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3.1.3 Civil Liberties Interaction 
Drawing on research that stresses the importance of civil liberties for both movement organizing 
and women’s political presence, I created a model with an interaction between women’s 
organizations and the Freedom House civil liberties score.  This is shown above in Model 2, 
where we see that the previously significant variables, Scandinavia and quota threshold, remain 
significant and strong predictors, and both organizations and the civil liberties interaction are 
significant.14  This interaction is shown below in Figure 1.15 
 
Figure 1. Civil Liberties Interaction on Percent Female Legislators 
 
                                                 
14 These findings are also robust to the inclusion and exclusion of the different development variables, which were 
tested in auxiliary models since aid, GDP, and civil liberties are likely correlated.  Also, in the auxiliary civil 
liberties score sample, the interaction, the civil liberties variable, and the organizations variable were all significant. 
 
15 In the predicted equations for this and subsequent interactions, I used the means of the other quantitative variables 
and zeroes for the dummy variables. 
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The solid line in the graph above shows the main effect of civil liberties; if there are no 
women’s organizations, then a higher civil liberties score (which means a higher level of 
democracy) is associated with lower numbers of women in parliament.  Although this 
relationship may seem surprising, past research on democracy and women in politics supports 
this finding.  More autocratic regimes often have higher numbers of women in politics.  
However, more recent research has qualified that finding in various ways, arguing, for example, 
for more nuanced definitions and measures of the different components of democracy and their 
change over time.  As shown by the other lines in the graph, the effect of democracy on women 
in politics is indeed mediated, here by women’s movement organizations. 
Even a small number of women’s organizations, which is illustrated by the dotted line, 
lessens the negative effect of democracy.  A low civil liberties score, or less civic freedom, is 
still linked to more women in parliament, but the effect of increasing civil liberties occurs at a 
less steep rate.  As the number of organizations increases, that effect is moderated even more.  
With an average number of organizations, which in this case is about 95, the relationship 
between democracy and female legislators begins to reverse.  The dashed line shows that less 
democratic nations have slightly fewer women in parliament.  Finally, a large number of 
women’s organizations, denoted by the long-dash line, distinctly reverses the initial trend.  Here 
higher levels of democracy are correlated with higher numbers of women in parliament.  The 
combination of a high level of democracy and a strong women’s movement relates positively to 
higher proportions of women in the legislature. 
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3.1.4 Muslim Interaction 
The percentage of the population identifying as Muslim is an important marker of a nation’s 
overall culture, particularly regarding ideals about women and women’s role in society.  Because 
the effect of organizations may vary by Muslim population size, I created an interaction variable 
between Muslim and log of organizations per capita.16  Shown in Model 3, both Scandinavia and 
quota threshold remain significant and positive.  However, the interaction fails to reach 
conventional values of statistical significance (p= 0.13).   
3.1.5 Aid Interaction 
Since NGO organizing may affect access to and amount of foreign funding received and 
international ties, I also tested the interaction between aid and organizations.  This is shown in 
Model 4.  Again, quota threshold and Scandinavia are both positive and significant.  However, 
the interaction term is not significant. 
3.1.6 GDP Interaction 
A country’s level of development may also affect both women’s parliamentary representation, as 
shown in previous research, and, presumably, the strength of women’s organizing.  Model 5 
shows the regression for this interaction model.17  Again, Scandinavia and quota threshold 
                                                 
16 I ran an auxiliary model with an interaction between percent Catholic and women’s organizations, but only 
Scandinavia and threshold were significant, and none of the other relationships changed. 
 
17 There was extreme multicollinearity between the linear and interaction terms, so I mean-centered both variables to 
get more representative coefficients.  Model 5 shows the mean-centered values. 
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remain significant.  The main effects of the interaction variables show us that without women’s 
organizations, GDP has a positive effect on women in parliament.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, 
with the solid line.  There is a slight positive association between GDP and the proportion of 
women in parliament.   
 
Figure 2. GDP Interaction on Percent Female Legislators 
 
 
The presence of women’s organizations, however, alters that association.  With an 
average number of women’s organizations per capita, the positive effect of GDP is increased, as 
shown by the dotted line.  The dashed line has an even steeper slope, illustrating that with an 
above average number of women’s organizations, the positive correlation between GDP and 
women in politics increases still further.   
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3.1.7 Regional Interactions 
I created interaction variables between each region and the log of the number of women’s 
organizations per capita.  With such a small sample size, a model with this many variables can 
only suggest very tentative results, but the findings are consistent with existing research on 
women’s organizing and women’s representation.  Table 2 shows us that like the past models, 
quota threshold is significant.  There are some other substantial changes, however.  Neither the 
Scandinavia nor the Scandinavia interaction variable are significant.  Of the regional variables, 
only Eastern Europe is significant.  Of the interaction variables, both Africa and Eastern Europe 
are significant, though in opposite directions.  These interactions variables will be discussed in 
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Table 2. Region Interaction Model Regressed on Percent Female Legislators in Lower House 
  Model 6 
 
  
 b                 
(Std Error) β  
(Log) Women's 
Organization 
12.95     
(10.81) 0.14  
Percent Women in Labor 
Force 
0.12     
(0.10) 0.15  
(Log) GDP 3.87     (3.28) 0.21  
(Log) Aid Received -0.33   (0.72) -0.06  
Percent Muslim -0.01   (0.04) -0.03  
Percent Catholic 0.03     (0.04) 0.11  
Latin America -4.22   (4.95) -0.16  
Latin America Interaction 17.36   (26.49) 0.10  
Asia -4.73   (5.74) -0.14  
Asia Interaction 75.11   (58.60) 0.19  
Africa 7.69     (4.85) 0.32  
Africa Interaction -45.25*   (23.31) -0.28  
Eastern Europe -9.79
t   
(5.83) -0.31  
Eastern Europe Interaction 92.28
t   
(52.61) 0.29  
Scandinavia 15.07   (30.11) 0.28  
Scandinavia Interaction 6.57   (117.66) 0.03  
Middle East -2.96   (10.05) -0.06  
Middle East Interaction -17.73  (49.36) -0.07  
PR System 2.99     (1.93) 0.14  
Threshold of Quota 0.18**   (0.07) 0.25  
Intercept -7.61 
 Adjusted R2 0.33 
 N 107 
            *p < 0.05    **p < 0.01   ***p < 0.001   tp < 0.1 (two-tailed tests) 
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First, Africa, which has been positively correlated to female legislators, is again positive 
here, when organizations is 0.18  The interaction between Africa and organizations is significant 
at 0.05, and is negative, meaning that organizations seem to have a moderating influence on 
African women’s election to parliament.  As shown in Figure 2, organizations do, in fact, 
decrease the “effect” of Africa on levels of women in politics.  In the West, represented by the 
solid line, increased women’s organizing is linked to increased political representation.  In 
Africa, increased organizing is actually linked to decreased political representation for women, 
as shown by the dashed line.  Some research supports this finding; women in the NGO sector 
tend to stay within that sphere, feeling that they can accomplish more there than within the often 
inefficient, unstable, or corrupt state. 
 
Figure 3.  Regional Interaction - Africa 
 
                                                 
18 Because of the collinearity between GDP and Africa, I ran an auxiliary model without GDP.  Africa remained 
significant, as did the other pertinent variables.  The standardized coefficient for Africa did decrease, however. 
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This is opposite of the other significant relationship in the regional interaction model, 
Eastern Europe.  In other models, as in this one, there has been a negative relationship between 
Eastern Europe and the dependent variable.  Here this relationship, which is significant at the 0.1 
level, shows that when there are no women’s organizations, Eastern European countries are less 
likely to have higher proportions of women in parliament.  But the positive, significant 
interaction shows that women’s organizing is actually having a positive effect on women’s 
representation in Eastern Europe.  As shown by the steeper slope of the dashed line in Figure 3, 
the effect of women’s organizing on political representation is much stronger in Eastern Europe 
than it is in the West. 
 




  38 
3.1.8 Reverse Regression 
In order to check that the relationship I hypothesized did indeed go in only one direction, I ran a 
limited number of auxiliary models using the number of organizations as the dependent variable, 
and percentage of women in parliament as my primary independent variable.  Here I used the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union’s archives, gathering legislator percentages from January 2000, in 
order to account for the time lag between women being elected to parliament and their effect on 
organizing.  Using GDP, labor force participation, percentages of Muslim and Catholic, civil 
liberties score, and regional variables, I found that the proportion of female legislators did not, in 
fact, significantly affect the number of women’s organizations.  GDP and Freedom House scores 
were the best predictors of number of organizations.  Of course, my initial data collection was 
geared toward explanation of political representation, so model specification problems may be at 
play here.  This does, however, support my claim that women’s organizing influences the 
number of women in the legislature, rather than the other way around.  
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
My findings reinforce, challenge, and expand past research on women in politics.  I found some 
factors, such as the Scandinavia region and quota thresholds, to be consistently strong predictors 
of women’s political representation in parliament.  Countries in Scandinavia have cultures that 
greatly value gender parity, policies that reflect that, and long histories of being trailblazers in 
women’s political rights and milestones.  Past research has found support for this strong 
relationship between Scandinavia and women’s political representation time and again, and my 
models do the same.  This relationship does not seem to be attributable to women’s organizing, 
however, as the interaction between Scandinavia and organizing was not significant.  Or, since 
Scandinavia has a long history of women in politics, and in many ways has been an international 
norm-setter in this area, perhaps women’s organizing was more important for political 
representation at an earlier time.  As the norms, cultural ideas about women in politics, and 
policy changes have become more institutionalized, perhaps women’s organizing has become 
less important to maintaining high numbers of women in political positions.  More research 
would be needed on this, however, to make conclusive claims. 
Quotas are a more recent addition to the field, and research has found more varied results 
regarding correlations between quotas and women’s representation.  Although quotas would 
seem to be a straightforward and direct indicator of higher numbers of women in politics, the 
type of quota, the threshold set, and enforcement are all important factors in determining the 
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success of a quota.  My measure here is simplified, counting both candidate and seat quotas at 
the national level.  Finding a strong correlation between threshold and percentage of female 
legislators is in line with previous research, although a more complex variable, perhaps taking 
into account enforcement, might yield different results.  Some research has mentioned the role of 
movements in advocating for quota legislation without fully investigating that linkage; I 
attempted an analysis that might help explain the relationship between the two by running an 
auxiliary model with an interaction between organizations and quota thresholds; neither the 
interaction nor the individual variables were significant.  There remains more to be explicated 
regarding the relationship between quotas and women’s organizations. 
My findings regarding interactions also support existing theories on the topic, as well as 
my own assumptions about organizing and political representation as being closely linked with 
culture.  Most of my interactions are attempts to address those linkages.  I start with the 
interaction between civil liberties score and organizations.  Without women’s organizations, 
there is a negative association between level of democracy and percent of female legislators.  
The interaction between the two is significant, and shows that organizations have a lessening 
effect on that negative relationship between democracy and women’s political representation.  
Organizations are a significant factor in increasing the proportion of women in parliament, 
particularly as level of democracy increases.  A high number of organizations actually reverses 
the relationship between democracy and women in politics, so that increasing civil liberties is 
associated with increasing numbers of women in politics. 
Some of my findings were unexpected, or go against what past scholarship has found.  I 
expected a higher percentage of women in the labor force, for example, to be significantly 
correlated with more women in politics, as work gives women financial resources and 
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independence, as well as serving as an indication about attitudes about women and gender roles 
and spheres.  In this sample, however, labor force participation was not significant.   As 
mentioned above, in the expanded, civil liberties sample, labor was a significant predictor of 
women in parliament, perhaps due to the inclusion of more developing countries with restricted 
political rights.  In countries where it is not unusual for women to work outside the home and be 
independent, to have access to resources, other factors seem to be more important in affecting 
women’s political presence.  This finding is also supported by the fact that I found a similar 
difference between the two samples when I substituted fertility rate for labor participation rate. 
I also expected the presence of a PR system to be positively correlated with more women 
in politics.  Although the relationship was positive, it was not significant in any of my models.  
As with labor force participation, however, proportional representation was significant at the 0.1 
level in several of the models with the civil liberties sample.  In some of the interaction models it 
lost that significance, but the difference between the two samples speaks to, again, the different 
mechanisms at play in developing countries, especially those with more restricted political rights. 
 Since Islam plays such an important cultural role, especially in terms of gender roles and 
expectations, percentage of the population that identifies as Muslim seems like a good predictor 
of the proportion of women in the legislature.  My analyses, however, did not support this 
expectation.  I found that although higher percentages of Muslims were associated with lower 
numbers of women in politics, these relationships were not significant.  The interaction between 
percent Muslim and women’s organizations was likewise not significant.  Organizations did 
become significant in this interaction model, meaning that if percent Muslim was 0, 
organizations would have a positive, significant effect on the proportion of women in the 
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legislature.  This seems to support my assumptions about the role of cultural factors in mediating 
not only political representation but also levels of organizing. 
Finally, my analyses expand the existing scholarship on women in politics and on social 
movements.  I employ a variable that is not usually included in research on women in politics, 
and I attempt to build an empirical model of a social movement outcome that is both cultural and 
political.  My findings show that, when important interactions are taken into account, women’s 
social movement organizations do in fact have a positive impact on the proportion of women in 
parliament.  Increased women’s movement organizing does lead to increased proportions of 
women in parliament when the relationships between organizing and civil liberties, religion, aid, 
and region are taken into account.  Official aid is an important factor that is linked to, but 
conceptually different from, basic definitions of development; it is also related to the level of 
NGO activity within a country and those organizations’ access to funding sources.  This is not a 
totally determining relationship, though; more women’s organizations still help to increase 
women’s political participation even when aid is 0.  The interaction between the two is not 
significant, but an analysis of effect of increased development assistance just on level of 
organizing might elucidate some of this relationship.  
I also investigate the relationships between this new variable – women’s organizations – 
and region.  Region is a useful, albeit imperfect, proxy for culture, which I maintain plays an 
integral role both in social movement organizing and in increasing the percentage of female 
legislators.  Both Africa and Eastern Europe were found to be significant regional interactions 
with women’s organizations, although in different ways.  Without social movement organizing, 
Africa as a region is positively correlated with higher numbers of women in parliament; Eastern 
Europe, on the other hand, is negatively correlated with higher number of women in politics 
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when there is no social movement organizing.  The interactions for these two variables show a 
dramatic shift, however.  The interaction between organizations and Africa is negative, 
suggesting that women’s movement organizations are actually moderating the influence of the 
region variable on political representation.  This is supported by recent research that discusses 
the prevalence in Africa of women choosing the sphere of NGOs over politics; not only are these 
very distinct spheres, working in one might preclude working in the other.  As more women are 
drawn to these women’s NGOs, then, there will be fewer women going into formal politics.  
However, this does somewhat contradict Tripp’s (2001) account of the role of women’s 
organizations in helping to democratize and increase women’s representation in many African 
states. 
For Eastern Europe, the trend is the opposite; social movement organizing seems to be 
increasing women’s political representation disproportionate to the region itself.  Much of the 
region has a recent past dominated by Soviet communism, where democracy and civil society 
were weak or nonexistent.  Women’s movement organizations have helped to build up that civil 
society, which is contributing to women’s political representation.  However, I should reiterate – 
the regional interaction model in particular, but actually all of my models, have a limited sample 
size and too many variables.  These findings are tentative and definitely need more investigation. 
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4.1 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Because of this and other shortcomings, this is only the first step in a larger research 
endeavor.  Future research should attempt to use more sophisticated methodology, as there are 
likely some reciprocal relationships and feedback loops between some of these variables that are 
not being explored here.   These relationships might also shift significantly over time, so 
longitudinal analysis would provide some insight into the ongoing dynamics. 
In addition, the project is in need of better measures of culture, in order to address how 
culture is affecting both organizing and women’s political presence.  Using region or religion 
provides some useful comparisons, but I cannot explore the actual mechanisms that are 
responsible for why regional interactions, for instance, work as they do.  With a better measure 
of culture, perhaps an expanded World Values Survey, some of these relationships could be 
explored and explained further.  Organizations in this dataset are obviously interacting with 
many other factors, and cultural differences may be at the heart of those interactions.  In 
addition, future research may augment these more developed methods with more developed case 
study analyses in order to address more of the detailed processes that lead from social movement 
organizing to political representation.  Studying individual activists and politicians or specific 
groups, may yield a richer explanation of the actual processes at work to augment the 
quantitative analysis. 
 I also recognize that the data source may be skewed.  Many social movements are small 
and local, perhaps even underground.  I recognize that without extensively traveling in and 
around each country (and probably even then) I cannot get a count that is truly representative of 
the level of women’s organizing.  I am employing a count for the measure of scope, which in 
many ways oversimplifies the depth and variety of movement organizing.  In attempting to do 
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such a broad survey, however, the depth will necessarily be limited.  Ideally, future projects will 
compile more comprehensive counts of organizations to give a more nuanced understanding of 
the scope of movement activity.  In a similar vein, further measures of movement success, such 
as the passage of woman-friendly legislation, would be a useful contribution.  
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
Although women have made substantial political gains, and there is wide variation among 
different countries, the fact remains that “in no country do women have political status, access, 
or influence equal to men’s” (Chowdhury et al 1994, emphasis in original).  And political 
inequality in particular, albeit not the only form of gender inequality by far, has profound 
implications for women.  Women’s issues are not represented well, or often even placed on the 
agenda, by male politicians, yet laws and policy have extremely broad implications for women’s 
lives – from the wages they earn to the reproductive freedom they have to the judicial recourse 
and protections they have against assault.  The presence of female representatives, then, can have 
far-reaching impact.  Knowing more about the specific factors that help increase the proportion 
of women elected to parliaments can contribute to increasing those proportions, and the research 
on women in politics has in fact been focused on investigating those factors.  For the most part, 
this field has not, however, studied women’s social movement organizing as one of these 
explanatory factors. 
Social movement organizing has been an important field for women to effect change, 
particularly since traditional, institutionalized politics was for so long officially, or now often 
implicitly, closed to women.  The dramatic growth of the international women’s movement over 
the past century has been one of the defining features of the modern world, occurring both 
parallel to and interdependently with the intensification of economic, political, and social 
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globalization.  Social movements, and women’s movements in particular, exist at an interchange 
with the transnational, and often work to bridge the local and global, in much the same way that 
they bridge the cultural and the political. 
With these observations in mind, I investigated the role of women’s social movement 
organizations registered with the United Nations – which represent that combination of both 
local and international – in increasing the proportions of women in parliaments around the world.  
I found that, when important interactions are taken into account, women’s organizations are 
positively associated with higher levels of women’s political representation.  The interaction 
between democracy, measured by Freedom House civil liberties score, and women’s 
organizations, for example, shows that together, more organizations and more civil liberties 
contributes to more women in politics.  Similarly, a stronger women’s movement, measured 
simply in terms of a greater number of organizations, increases the positive effect of GDP on 
percent of female legislators. 
The study also finds that there are interactions occurring with some of the cultural 
variables, as well, here captured mostly by region variables.  Organizations interact significantly 
with sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, though in very different ways.  In Africa, where 
women’s political participation tends to be higher, organizations actually have a moderating 
effect on that regional association.  This may be due to the more distinct separation between 
NGOs and national governments in the region.  In Eastern Europe, a region that is negatively 
associated with women’s political representation, the presence of women’s organizations 
reverses that trend.  In countries with a history of communism and nominal women’s political 
participation, the post-communist growth of the civic sphere, and women’s organizing with it, is 
perhaps playing a significant role in increasing the number of women in parliament. 
  48 
These findings are tentative.  The models are somewhat over-specified due to the small 
sample size, and more sophisticated analyses of some of the reciprocal relationships between 
these variables are needed.  In addition, a better conceptualization and measure of culture – 
which plays an important role in influencing women’s political participation and as a movement 
outcome and facilitator – is needed to fully address the complicated role of culture in these 
models.  Despite its shortcomings, however, this paper makes two contributions.  On a 
methodological and conceptual level, I provide a bridge between social movement studies and 
political sociology about women in politics.  On a more concretely applicable level, I provide 
evidence for movement success, and that shows the need for continued social movement 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE OF COUNTRIES IN SAMPLE 
Albania Dominican Rep. Kuwait Papua New Guinea Ukraine 
Algeria East Timor Kyrgyzstan Paraguay United Arab Emirates 
Angola Ecuador Latvia Peru United Kingdom 
Argentina Egypt Lebanon Philippines United States 
Armenia El Salvador Lesotho Poland Uruguay 
Australia Estonia Liberia Portugal Venezuela 
Austria Ethiopia Lithuania Romania Vietnam 
Azerbaijan Finland Macedonia Russia Yemen 
Bangladesh France Madagascar Rwanda Zambia 
Belgium Gabon Malawi Senegal  
Benin The Gambia Malaysia Serbia  
Bolivia Georgia Mali Sierra Leone  
Bosnia-Herzegovina Germany Mauritania Singapore  
Botswana Ghana Mauritius Slovakia  
Brazil Greece Mexico Slovenia  
Bulgaria Guatemala Moldova South Africa  
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Mongolia South Korea  
Burundi Haiti Morocco Spain  
Cambodia Honduras Mozambique Sri Lanka  
Canada Hungary Namibia Swaziland  
Central African Rep. India Nepal Sweden  
Chile Indonesia Netherlands Switzerland  
Colombia Ireland New Zealand Tajikistan  
Congo Israel Nicaragua Tanzania  
Costa Rica Italy Niger Thailand  
Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Nigeria Togo  
Croatia Japan Norway Trinidad and Tobago 
Cyprus Jordan Oman Tunisia  
Czech Republic Kazakhstan Pakistan Turkey  
Denmark Kenya Panama Uganda  
 
Note: Nations in bold make up the full FH score sample; the others are those only in the civil liberties sample. 
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APPENDIX B 
 


































in lower house 1.000          
Average of 
lower and upper 0.988 1.000         
Women's orgs 0.010 0.008 1.000        
Women's orgs 
per capita 0.227 0.238 0.167 1.000       
Log women's 
orgs per capita 0.257 0.279 0.178 0.947 1.000      
Log GDP 0.276 0.268 0.182 0.310 0.355 1.000     
Log Aid -0.272 -0.260 -0.259 -0.172 -0.178 -0.742 1.000    
Women in labor 
force 0.181 0.215 -0.074 0.011 -0.011 -0.396 0.205 1.000   
Percent Muslim -0.278 -0.279 -0.042 -0.093 -0.099 -0.315 0.264 -0.217 1.000  
Percent Catholic 0.179 0.183 -0.030 -0.001 -0.017 0.150 -0.117 -0.090 -0.440 1.000 
Latin America 0.021 0.027 -0.100 -0.046 -0.024 0.028 0.117 -0.159 -0.276 0.567 
Asia -0.112 -0.115 0.106 -0.167 -0.214 -0.059 -0.100 -0.137 0.126 -0.258 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa -0.096 -0.084 -0.093 -0.111 -0.121 -0.705 0.487 0.545 0.264 -0.245 
Eastern Europe 0.556 -0.079 -0.133 -0.138 -0.163 0.110 -0.005 -0.010 -0.136 -0.083 
Scandinavia 0.400 0.401 -0.039 0.142 0.208 0.255 -0.238 0.094 -0.105 -0.189 
Middle East and 
North Africa -0.207 -0.225 -0.039 0.029 0.059 0.134 0.017 -0.346 0.422 -0.171 
PR system 0.232 0.204 -0.190 0.051 0.033 0.221 -0.184 -0.204 -0.113 0.216 
National quota 0.141 0.125 -0.045 -0.093 -0.088 -0.138 0.104 -0.026 0.059 0.262 
Quota 
Threshold 0.224 0.217 -0.028 -0.033 -0.021 0.003 0.034 -0.033 -0.003 0.366 
HDI 0.259 0.255 0.162 0.291 0.341 0.967 -0.714 -0.391 -0.394 0.181 
Freedom House 
Civil Liberties 0.335 0.327 0.164 0.315 0.360 0.742 -0.640 -0.111 -0.394 0.161 
            
Mean 19.60 19.66 94.81 0.42 0.14 3.88 2.36 54.76 17.08 34.13 
Standard 
Deviation 10.37 10.33 228.34 0.52 0.11 0.58 1.95 13.02 29.63 34.42 
Minimum 0.9 0.9 0 0 0 2.54 0 21 0.1 0 
Maximum 45 45 2104 4.49 0.74 4.79 5.87 91 99 98 
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
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Bivariate and Descriptive Statistics, continued 
























America 1.000           





-0.277 -0.199 1.000        
 
Eastern 
Europe -0.182 -0.131 -0.208 1.000        
Scandina





-0.108 -0.078 -0.124 -0.020 -0.043 1.000     
 
PR 
system 0.192 -0.249 -0.194 0.186 0.189 0.036 1.000     
National 
quota 0.210 0.070 -0.066 0.109 -0.136 -0.058 0.113 1.000    
Threshol
d of quota 0.256 0.010 -0.131 0.055 -0.121 -0.108 0.151 0.882 1.000   





-0.080 -0.203 -0.396 0.152 0.246 -0.103 0.330 -0.108 0.042 -0.737 1.000 
             
Mean 0.19 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.52 0.32 8.68 0.66 2.60 
Standard 
Deviation 0.40 0.32 0.43 0.33 0.19 0.21 0.50 0.47 14.19 0.19 1.28 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26 1 
Maximu
m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 50 0.94 5 
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